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Abstract
Using data collected from one of the most popular ridesharing platforms, we illus-
trate how mobility has changed after the exit from the Covid-19 induced confinement.
We measure the impact of the Covid-19 outbreak on the level of mobility and the price
of ridesharing. Finally, we show that the pandemic has exacerbated ethnic discrimi-
nation. Our results suggest that a decision-maker encouraging the use of ridesharing
during the pandemic should account for the impact of the perceived health risks on
ridesharing prices and should find ways to ensure fair access.
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1 Motivation
Pandemic notwithstanding, equitable and cost-effective transportation systems are indis-
pensable to the functioning of modern economies. Meanwhile, in recent months, public-
health experts have repeatedly called to avoid crowded and enclosed spaces, both typically
associated with public transportation.1 In fact, Harris (2020) argues that New York’s subway
was "a major disseminator if not the principal transmission vehicle" in the city’s Covid-19
outbreak.2
In France, the government encourages ridesharing as the country emerges from the Covid-
19 induced lock-downs. Ridesharing, contrasted with traditional means of public transporta-
tion, involves a lower number of people traveling together and therefore, might be a way to
keep the transmission rates of the virus at low levels, without restricting mobility. It is
unclear whether the government’s oral encouragement is sufficient to convince people to get
into a stranger’s car, especially during a pandemic. Here, we look into what happens to the
most popular ridesharing service in France as the country lifts shelter-at-home orders.
The ridesharing platform that we study, called BlaBlaCar, is a marketplace for city-to-
city rides, where drivers are generally non-professionals. The platform matches a driver, who
decides the route and the price, with passengers. In this way, the service allows the drivers
to cover part of their costs and provides cheap transportation for passengers. The flexibility
in terms of destinations, departure times, and prices might turn out to be of particular value
in the uncertain times of re-opening. In this paper, we use observational data to highlight
some developments on the platform over the last two months.
1See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html
2The final jury on the role of public transportation in the spread of Covid-19 is still out.
For example, a recent study by Santé Publique France (2020) shows that none out of 150
Covid-19 clusters identified in France between the 9th of May and 3rd of June were related
to public transportation. Furthermore, methodological concerns over the results of Harris (2020)




Figure 1: French minister of ecological transition and solidarity encouraging use of rideshar-
ing.
Source: Twitter Le Point account
First, we show rapid growth in the number of trips after the shelter-at-home orders were
lifted. This increase happened mostly in regions less affected by the Covid-19 outbreak, in
terms of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. Second, we document a substantial dispersion
in prices set by drivers. We also provide evidence suggesting a price premium associated
with traveling in this period. The prices are particularly high in the regions most affected by
the Covid-19 outbreak. Such an increase in prices could result from a higher perception of
health risks associated with traveling with a stranger. We check the robustness of this result
by exploring the errors of daily reports in Covid-19 cases and by excluding regions following
different re-opening protocol.
Finally, studying reviews left by past passengers we show the ethnic composition of cars
and how it changed during the pandemic. In particular, we first, document an increase
in the number of passengers from ethnic minorities, and second, we show some evidence
suggesting that drivers from the ethnic majority that review travel requests manually are
less likely to accept a minority passenger during the Covid-19 outbreak than before it.3 To
obtain this result we exploit the fact that for a large subset of drivers in our data we observe
all the reviews, both written by passengers traveling with these drivers before the Covid-19
outbreak and during it.
3McLaren (2020) provides evidence of a strong positive correlation between total Covid-19 cases and the
share of a minority population in a county. Interestingly, the difference can be explained by the use of public
transport.
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This paper relates to a quickly growing economics literature on the Covid-19 outbreak;
Brodeur et al. (2020) provides an overview of this literature. Several papers focused on
the inequality of the impact of the pandemic across racial or ethnic lines. In a related
paper, Bartos et al. (2020), using a representative sample from the Czech Republic, shows a
magnified hostility against foreigners, especially towards those from Asia. At the same time,
they show no change in attitude towards domestic out-groups (migrants and minorities).
The rest of the article is organized as follows: in section two, we discuss the timing of
lock-down orders and the re-opening in France. We present data that we use to measure
the geographical differences in the severity of the Covid-19 outbreak. Section three contains
further details on BlaBlaCar, discussion of the data collection process, and finally, we present
some descriptive statistics. In section four, we present the main descriptive evidence on the
number of trips offered and the prices. Section five focuses on ethnic discrimination, and
finally, section six concludes.
2 Covid-19 outbreak, lock-down, and re-opening in France
France introduced a shelter-at-home order on the 17th of March. Mobility was restricted to
essential travels and public transportation was substantially limited. These measures were
heavily policed. The first stage of re-opening started on the 11th of May; the restriction to
essential travels was lifted. However, the non-essential trips were limited to 100 kilometers
from the address of residence. The country was divided into green and red zones. The red
zone consisted of departments that were most heavily impacted by Covid-19 and some of
the measures were enforced longer.4 Finally, on the 2nd of June, the limit to 100 kilometers
was lifted.
Figure 2 shows the change in mobility trends in places related to public transport hubs
such as subway, bus, and train stations from Google’s Covid-19 Community Mobility report.
The three vertical lines are on the: 17th of March (lock-down), 11th of May (1st stage
opening), and 2nd of June (2nd stage opening). From this figure, we can see a sharp drop in
mobility following the introduction of the shelter-at-home measures and a gradual increase
as the country started the re-opening.
Grand Est and Ile de France are regions most impacted by the Covid-19 outbreak, while
Normandy and Occitanie were amongst the less influenced regions. We can see towards the
4Department (from French département) is the administrative unit of France. It is the middle of the
three levels of the regional government, between the regions and the communes.
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Figure 2: Mobility in France during Covid19 outbreak
Note: Change in mobility in public transport hubs from baseline in selected regions of France.
Vertical lines from left: 17th of March (lock-down), 11th of May (1st stage opening), and
2nd of June (2nd stage opening). Source: https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/
end of the graph (late May and June) that regions less affected were approaching the baseline
faster than Grand Est and Ile de France.
Covid-19 outbreak and related measures: We use four variables, at the daily fre-
quency, to proxy the severity of the Covid-19 outbreak per department. First, we have the
number of people that tested positive for the virus per thousand people in the department
- (positive). We also include the number of tests carried out in the department (tested).
Second, we use hosp and deaths which are the number of hospitalizations per thousand in-
habitants in the department and the number of deaths per thousand. The source of this
data are daily reports available at https://www.data.gouv.fr/.
In all regressions that follow we use sums of these measures per department (sums across
time, ie, day); thus, we exploit the differences across departments.5 Figure 3 presents the
geographical variation in the number of Covid-19 related deaths in France.
Additionally, we define a binary variable red zone, taking the value of one when the
observed trip originates from a city in a department designated as heavily impacted by the
Covid-19 outbreak and zero otherwise.
All measures defined above and used in the subsequent analysis refer to the city of
departure. Finally, to control for the heterogeneity across departments, we include the share
5These data have also an interesting time dimension, which shows the Covid-19 outbreak in France in
time, which we discuss in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Covid-19 outbreak in France
Note: Logarithm of the number of deaths per 100 thousand per department. Source
https://www.data.gouv.fr/
of population above 60 and 75 years per department, and the total population; these variables
come from INSEE - the national statistics bureau of France.
3 BlaBlaCar and the data collection
BlaBlaCar is the global leader of city-to-city ridesharing; it is particularly popular in France,
where it was established. BlaBlaCar drivers are mostly non-professionals that are looking
for a way to cover some costs of day-to-day commutes or longer trips. On BlaBlaCar, the
driver sets the price; the passenger observes available drivers and sends a booking request.
Some drivers are using automatic acceptance, others reserve the option to manually review
the requests.
BlaBlaCar operates at the long tail of transportation; it is most popular on routes where
public transportation is of low quality or at times of the day when it is hard to find a ride.
The French government has been actively promoting ridesharing. In France, there are over
2000 zones for ridesharing (aires de covoiturage), which are spots close to key transportation
hubs and highway entrances that are dedicated drop-off and pick-up locations.
We have started collecting data from BlaBlaCar on the 8th of May, that is during the
lock-down in France, and three days before the first stage of reopening and continued until
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the 12th of July. It’s worth pointing out that until the 26th of June BlaBlaCar has restricted
the number of seats a driver can offer to one.
The main source of our data is the BlaBlaCar website and it has been collected using the
BlaBlaCar’s API. Some additional information that is specific to drivers and not available
on the API has been collected using a web-scraper. Each day we were looking for all trips
that depart from all cities that have a Hôtel de préfecture, which means that they can be
considered as a capital of the administrative area called department, or in its vicinity. There
are in total 102 departments; we have not collected any trips in oversea departments, and
we have collected but did not include in the present analysis trips departing from Corsica
(there were 76 of them during the sample period).6
Table 1 provides summary statistics of main variables.
Table 1: Summary statistics of selected variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
price 239,934 16.153 12.040 1.115 6.691 22.304 221.928
distance 239,934 269.328 226.425 0 103 380 1,567
price per km 239,923 0.115 0.302 0.001 0.034 0.124 58.549
average rating 52,375 4.409 1.105 0.000 4.500 4.800 5.000
number of ratings 52,375 42.420 62.029 0.000 7.000 51.000 778.000
red zone 239,934 0.265 0.441 0 0 1 1
hosp 239,934 34.185 27.274 2.852 14.678 50.302 140.141
deaths 239,934 15.766 15.525 0.222 6.102 21.012 101.031
share 60+ 239,934 0.284 0.045 0.097 0.253 0.322 0.393
share 75+ 239,934 0.103 0.020 0.021 0.089 0.116 0.149
positive 239,934 0.956 1.056 0.002 0.146 1.458 3.790
tested 239,934 0.013 0.013 0.00004 0.004 0.017 0.066
rating 1,889,892 4.653 0.602 1 4 5 5
reviewer minority 1,889,892 0.089 0.284 0 0 0 1
reviewer male 1,889,892 0.489 0.500 0 0 1 1
driver minority 52,375 0.096 0.294 0 0 0 1
driver male 52,375 0.698 0.459 0 0 1 1
In the data collected from BlaBlaCar’s API, we observe the price set by the driver and
the commission added by BlaBlaCar. In Table 1 and in the subsequent analysis, we use the
price paid by the passenger, which is the price that includes added commission. Distance is
6The oversea departments are: Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Guianas, Réunion, and Mayotte.
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measured in kilometers (km). Number of ratings is the number of reviews (stars from 1 to 5)
available on profiles of drivers. Average rating is the average of these ratings. Car categories
are assigned by BlaBlaCar and include Berline, for example Ford Fiesta, Renault Clio, Van,
e.g., Peugeot 5008, Ford C-MAX, Break e.g., Peugeot 508, Audi A3, Tourism e.g. Ford
Focus, Citroen Picasso, and the last category is Cabriolet. We also observe whether a driver
decided to signal that they allow smoking and pets and whether the booking is automatic
or the driver reviews the requests.
Finally, we used the names available on drivers’ profiles to establish their gender and
whether the name is either of Arabic or African origin suggesting that the driver is of an
ethnic minority. Additionally, we used the names associated with reviews left by the past
passengers (both before the pandemic and during) to establish the gender and the ethnicity
of passengers. In this way, we also have some information about the driver-passenger pairs
before and during the pandemic.
There is a number of missing observations because our data collection routine collects
different variables on a different speed. We have collected data on all the trips available from
the API; however, drivers’ characteristics that were not available from the API (for example
ratings and reviews) and were scrapped from the website, are available only for some drivers.
4 Descriptive evidence
In this section, we explore the variation across departments in the severity of the Covid-19
outbreak to study its impact on the number of trips offered on BlaBlaCar and on the prices
for these trips.
4.1 Rapid increase in the number of trips post-reopening
With shelter-at-home orders in place and mobility reduced to essential workers, the activity
on the BlaBlaCar platform was minimal. As the country started to ease these restrictions,
the number of drivers offering trips on BlaBlaCar started to slowly take off. Figure 4 shows
the total number of trips per day in the sample period. The two vertical lines indicate the
key moments of the de-confinement.
First, some restrictions were lifted on the 11th of May. Prior to this date, only essential
trips were allowed and this has been strictly enforced. After the 11th of May, the non-
essential trips up to 100 kilometers from the place of residence were permitted. Next, the
line on the 2nd of June shows the second stage of easing of restrictions when traveling in the
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Figure 4: Growth in the number of trips
Note: First vertical line 11th of May is the first stage of easing of restrictions, the second
one is the 2nd of June
country became mostly unrestricted. During the period between the 11th of May and the
2nd of June, some departments were indicated as red, referring to their higher level of virus
circulation. Restrictions in these areas were stricter and enforced more severely.
From Figure 4, we observe that the number trips increased very quickly from the total
of 36 trips per day on the 8th of May to around 5000 trips daily in the second part of June
and beginning of July.7
In the second step, we explore the geographical variation in this growth. To do so, we sum
the number of trips by the department and the day of departure and regress these sums on
different measures of severity of the virus outbreak. We use four measures: positive for the
number of people tested positive per thousand, hosp, for the number of hospitalization per
thousand, deaths for the number of deaths per thousand, and red zone which is the binary
variable taking the value one when the ride departs from a department in the red zone and
zero otherwise. The results are presented in Table 2. All regressions have day fixed effects.
The dependent variable is in logarithm and we use the OLS estimator. Standard errors are
clustered at the department level.
Note that all our measures of the severity of the Covid-19 outbreak are related to a
lower number of trips departing from that department, even after controlling for the total
population. The magnitude of this effect is quite substantial. An increase from the 25th
7The dates of opening were announced well in advance.
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Table 2: The severity of the virus’ impact determines the number of trips
Dependent variable:
log total trips per department




red zone −0.44∗∗∗ (0.15)
total pop 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Constant −0.13 (0.24) −0.08 (0.24) −0.11 (0.24) −0.16 (0.24)
Observations 5,602 5,602 5,602 5,602
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.59
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.58
Residual Std. Error (df = 5535) 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76
F Statistic (df = 66; 5535) 112.10∗∗∗ 113.24∗∗∗ 111.15∗∗∗ 118.29∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
percentile to the 75th percentile in the number of positive tests is associated with a decrease
in the number of trips by 22%, as indicated by the first regression. Using the regression in
column two, hospitalization per thousand, we find that the change from the 25th percentile
in the number of hospitalizations per thousand to the 75th percentile is correlated with a
21% decrease in the number of trips departing from the city.
4.2 Prices during the pandemic
BlaBlaCar drivers set prices themselves; they receive a recommendation from BlaBlaCar that
the price should be 0.062 EUR per km. At this price, a driver should be able (for an average
car) to roughly cover the costs of the trip by selling two seats. However, this suggestion is
not prominently displayed and generally, most of the drivers deviate from it.
There are several reasons why prices in the period of a pandemic might differ from
"normal" times, for example:
1. Low demand due to the introduced measures: during a substantial part of the period
of the analysis, the non-essential movement of people was restricted to less than 100
km.
2. Low supply of transportation alternatives: in the period of the study, severe restrictions
in public transportation were in place, and the number of drivers on the BlaBlaCar
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was much lower than during the pre-pandemic period. Moreover, drivers were allowed
to sell only one seat in their cars to promote social distancing.
3. Health risks associated with sharing a ride: higher risk as perceived by passengers can
result in a decrease in the demand for seats. On the other hand, drivers might find
it more costly (in terms of expected health costs) to have someone in the car, thus
they might set a higher price. We conducted a simple text analysis of the comments
associated with the listings and we find that 20% of drivers mention "masks" in their
description. This suggests that drivers consider health hazards.
The direction of the change in prices, as compared to pre-pandemic levels would indicate
which of the above-mentioned effects dominate. Unfortunately, we do not have access to
comparable prices from before the Covid-19 outbreak. We will, however, use the geographical
variation in the severity of Covid-19 measures to investigate, which of these forces are likely
to prevail. Additionally, we provide some comparison with Lambin and Palikot (2019) (LP
herein), which has a large dataset encompassing listings posted in 2017 and 2018.
Figure 5 presents a distribution of prices per kilometer, the green line is the mean. We
provide two points of reference: the red vertical line is the price suggested by BlaBlaCar,
and the orange line is a mean price from LP. The mean price per kilometer is substantially
higher both than the price recommended by the BlaBlaCar and the price documented in
LP. This suggests that the low supply and health risk as perceived by the drivers are the
dominant factors.
However, a closer inspection of this distribution shows that there is substantial dispersion
in prices. The price on the 25th percentile is 0.03 EUR per km while the price on the 75th
percentile is 0.12 EUR per km. Furthermore, the median price is 0.065; thus, most of the
drivers set prices that are around the price suggested by the BlaBlaCar. The Gini coefficient
of prices in our dataset is 0.46, while in the LP it is 0.11.8 A substantially higher Gini
coefficient provides further evidence of the high price dispersion. Finally, the coefficient of
variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to mean) is significantly higher too: in the
current dataset, it amounts to 1.11, while in LP to 0.83. Thus, it has increased by 34%. We





j=1 |xi − xj |
2n2x̄
,
where x are observed prices n is the number of observations and x̄ is the mean price. To calculate the Gini
coefficient and the coefficient of variation we have used only a subset of our prices associated with trips that
depart or arrive to Paris in order to make the sample more comparable to the LP sample. Including the
entire dataset does not alter the conclusion.
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Figure 5: Distribution of prices per km
Note: Red vertical line - price recommended by BlaBlaCar; orange vertical line - mean price
in LP; green vertical line - mean in the current sample
interpret this as a 34% increase in perceived risk or in the uncertainty of offering the service,
for which drivers require compensation, so they set higher prices.
To shed some light on the factors that contribute to the differences in prices, we provide
regressions controlling for the severity of the Covid-19 outbreak in the department from
which the ride departs. Results are in Table 3. Here we also include controls for the driver
level of reputation (the number of ratings and the average rating); additionally, we include
whether the driver has a manual acceptance of booking requests, i.e. if she reserves the right
to accept or reject the passenger, driver’s gender, smoking and pet policy, and the category
of the car. Each of the regressions control for day fixed effects. We use the OLS estimator
and cluster the standard errors at the level of department.9
We observe that all measures of the impact of the virus are associated with higher prices
per kilometer. The impact is highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the economic
significance of it is also substantial. Around the mean, an increase in the number of positive
cases per thousand by one unit is associated with an increase in prices by 6.5% while, an
increase in the rate of hospitalization by a unit leads to prices higher by 0.25%.
9In Appendix B, we show results of similar regressions that include only controls collected with BlaBlaCar
API, which results in a substantially increased sample.
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Table 3: The impact of the Covid-19 circulation on the price per kilometer
Dependent variable:
log(price km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)




red zone 0.067∗∗ (0.031)
total pop 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.00003)
manual booking 0.192∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.192∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.012)
driver male 0.162∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.162∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.163∗∗∗ (0.012)
average rating 0.024∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.007)
number ratings −0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001)
smoking 0.082∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.085∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.083∗∗∗ (0.010)
pets −0.019 (0.013) −0.021∗ (0.013) −0.022∗ (0.013) −0.019 (0.012)
Constant −1.631∗∗∗ (0.134) −1.672∗∗∗ (0.147) −1.614∗∗∗ (0.141) −1.753∗∗∗ (0.161)
Car Category x x x x
Day FE x x x x
Observations 37,873 37,873 37,873 37,873
R2 0.456 0.456 0.454 0.457
Adjusted R2 0.455 0.455 0.453 0.456
Residual Std. Error 0.759 (df = 37796) 0.759 (df = 37796) 0.760 (df = 37796) 0.759 (df = 37795)
F Statistic 417.403∗∗∗ (df = 76; 37796) 417.131∗∗∗ (df = 76; 37796) 414.329∗∗∗ (df = 76; 37796) 413.186∗∗∗ (df = 77; 37795)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
4.2.1 Robustness
Our findings are based on observational data, which does not allow us to claim with full
confidence a causal nature of the identified patterns. However, to reinforce the conclusion
that the increase in perceived health risk results in an increase in prices, we provide two
robustness checks. First, we exploit misreports in daily counts of Covid-19 cases as a source
of exogenous variation in the perception of such risk. Second, we exclude red regions, due
to differences in the enforcement of shelter-at-home orders.
Misreports of daily Covid-19 counts: Daily reports of the Covid-19 cases exhibit sud-
den jumps; we show this in Figure 6. These day to day jumps, or discontinuities, might be
due to several reasons such as, for example, mistakes in earlier reporting or a large batch
of tests carried out on a given day. It is, however, unlikely that they are due to a sudden
change in the number of infections (especially the negative shocks).
One might worry that our claim of the risk premium is due to confounders. That is, there
might be omitted (from regressions) region-specific characteristics that are both correlated
with the number of Covid-19 cases and the prices. Thus, the positive relationship that we
showcase is spurious. If there are, indeed, important variables that we have omitted from
our analysis, they are probably unrelated to the errors in reporting of Covid-19 cases. Hence,
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Figure 6: Daily reports of Covid-19 cases in France
Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/france/
if drivers and passengers use the daily reports in the number of Covid-19 cases, to evaluate
the risk of traveling by ride-sharing, we can exploit the errors in these reports as a source of
exogenous variation.
In the time-window of our dataset, there are four shocks: three of them are positive (28th
and 30th of May, and 26th of June) and one is negative (2nd of June). Drivers’ perception of
the health hazard just before the positive (negative) jump should be lower (higher) than just
after it. Indeed, the prices in our dataset seem to react to such discrete changes. The prices
one day before the positive jump are 6% lower than one day after it. The negative shock has
the opposite impact on the perception of risk. So when we include both types of shocks, we
compare the prices after the negative shock and before the positive one, with prices before
the negative shock and after the positive one. Such comparison leads to a change in prices
by 3.4%.
To control for potential changes in drivers’ characteristics before and after such shocks,
region-specific effects, and the time trend, we carry out regression analysis. To do so, we
use the sub-sample that includes only trips that depart one day before and one day after
these discontinuities. Results are in Table 4. In the second regression, we control for time
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trend and in the third one, additionally, for department fixed effects. We are interested in
the variable shock, which takes the value of 1 after positive shocks (31st of May and 27th
of June) and before the negative one (1st of June), and zero otherwise (27th of May, 3rd of
June, and 25th of June).10 As before, standard errors are clustered at the department level.




shock 0.080∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.084∗∗∗ (0.029)
distance −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.003∗∗∗ (0.0001)
manual booking 0.212∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.211∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.199∗∗∗ (0.022)
driver male 0.197∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.200∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.022)
average rating 0.008 (0.013) 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.013)
number ratings −0.0001 (0.0002) −0.0001 (0.0002) 0.00003 (0.0002)
smoking 0.062∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.063∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.019)
pets −0.024 (0.023) −0.022 (0.023) −0.024 (0.024)
Constant −2.291∗∗∗ (0.079) −48.165 (32.095) −53.793∗ (31.669)
Car Category x x x
Time Trend x x
Department FE x
Observations 6,120 6,120 6,120
R2 0.485 0.485 0.511
Adjusted R2 0.483 0.484 0.503
Residual Std. Error 0.757 (df = 6105) 0.757 (df = 6104) 0.743 (df = 6014)
F Statistic 409.915∗∗∗ (df = 14; 6105) 383.100∗∗∗ (df = 15; 6104) 59.870∗∗∗ (df = 105; 6014)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The increase in price following a sudden change in the number of reported cases is robust
to changes in drivers’ characteristics, time-trend, and the region fixed effects. To calculate




,where δ̂ is the estimated coefficients and V̂ (δ̂) is the variance of it. In this way, we find
that the impact of the dummy shock is 8.7% (we use the coefficient form the last column).
The estimated coefficient does not take into account, the fact that the included shocks are
of different magnitude. Nevertheless, we conclude from this that an increase in perception
of health risk translates into higher prices.
10We have excluded the 29th of June because it’s between two positive shocks.
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Excluding red regions: In the next step, we exclude regions marked as red. Indeed,
since the level of public transportation restrictions, and the enforcement of the ban on non-
essential trips over 100km, might have been stricter in these departments, the prices there
would be further increased due to no health hazard risks. The results are in Table 5.
We find that even excluding the regions which were hit the hardest and just exploring
the differences in the level of virus circulation within the green departments, we find that
there is a higher level of prices per kilometer when there are more cases, hospitalizations,
and deaths related to Covid-19.









manual booking 0.204∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.205∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.205∗∗∗ (0.014)
driver male 0.170∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.169∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.169∗∗∗ (0.013)
average rating 0.019∗∗ (0.009) 0.019∗∗ (0.009) 0.019∗∗ (0.009)
number of ratings −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001)
smoking 0.073∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.074∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.074∗∗∗ (0.012)
pets −0.026∗ (0.015) −0.027∗ (0.014) −0.026∗ (0.014)
Constant −1.759∗∗∗ (0.047) −1.886∗∗∗ (0.074) −1.865∗∗∗ (0.075)
Car Category x x x
Day FE x x x
Observations 28,161 28,161 28,161
R2 0.463 0.463 0.463
Adjusted R2 0.461 0.462 0.461
Residual Std. Error (df = 28086) 0.750 0.750 0.750
F Statistic (df = 74; 28086) 327.015∗∗∗ 327.147∗∗∗ 326.852∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
To conclude, at this stage, we cannot completely isolate the impact of the increased
health hazard on the prices. The three factors mentioned earlier (the demand decrease, the
negative shock to supply of other means of transportation, and health risk) are likely all at
play.11 Nevertheless, we can conclude that the health factor plays an important role: higher
prices in regions that are more affected by the virus (even in the restricted sample), the
11In Appendix C, we try to disentangle the supply and demand effects by studying the number of sold
seats.
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frequent mentioning of the need to have masks in the shared car, and the impact of daily
reports suggest that drivers are taking into account the health risk factor.
5 Impact of the pandemic on ethnic discrimination
In our sample, there are only drivers that used the platform at least once after the 8th of
May. However, most of them used the platform before as well; the average number of ratings
is 43. Thus, for each driver in our sample, we have reviews that she obtained before and
during the pandemic.12 Furthermore, we also know the names of reviewers which allows us
to establish the ethnicity and gender of the passengers. In total, we have 278 thousands of
reviews left during the pandemic and 2.35 millions of reviews left before it.13
We observe that the share of passengers that are of ethnic minority increases substantially
during the pandemic, specifically from 9% to 14%. We document this increase in Figure 7,
which shows the share of minority passengers per day, starting from January 2019. We see
that the share of minority passengers was rather stable before the 17th of March, during the
lock-down the share of minority reviewers was high and volatile (there is also much fewer
observations in this period - 30 thousand), after the shelter-at-home orders were lifted the
share of minority passengers stayed at a level higher than pre-pandemic.
Furthermore, we observe that the increase in the number of minority passengers oc-
curs both in cars with minority and nonminority drivers. A nonminority driver before the
pandemic had on average 8% of minority passengers, and 13% during the pandemic, while
minority drivers increased their share of minority passengers from 16% to 23%.14
Again, several factors could contribute to a higher share of minority passengers during
the lock-down: for example, minorities might be more likely to be essential workers, thus
during the lock-down they had to commute to work.15
Note that it is also important to recognize that passengers before and during the pandemic
have access to a different set of drivers. For example, if, during the pandemic, we would
observe a higher share of ethnic minority drivers, a passenger who prefers a majority driver
12In this section we use the 17th of March as the start date of the pandemic, which was the day in which
lock-down has been implemented.
13Prior literature used names to establish ethnicity; see for example Rubinstein and Brenner (2014);
Laouénan and Rathelot (2020). For the purpose of this section, we assume that the propensity to leave a
review is the same during the pandemic and before. Note, that generally, a very high share of passengers
leave reviews on BlaBlaCar.
14Such horizontal sorting is partly due to the route or the day of the trip. The means computed above do
not control for such factors.
15Borjas and Cassidy (2020) and Coven and Gupta (2020) provide evidence of this from the United States.
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Figure 7: Share of minority passengers per day
Note: The share of reviews written by minority passengers per day. Vertical line March 17.
might find it harder to book a trip during the pandemic then before it. In the current version
we do not control for the selection into the sample on ethnicity (and gender) of drivers, but
one should recognize that they play a role. (However, we observe that the shares of female
and minority drivers are roughly similar to those provided by LP).
Prior literature has shown a positive relationship between greater exposure to health
threats and negative attitudes towards out-group members. O’Shea et al. (2020) shows that
in US higher exposure to infectious diseases, exacerbates racial prejudice. Do we observe
that an increased health hazard, as perceived by the drivers, makes them less eager to accept
a minority passenger?
Recall that, on BlaBlaCar, drivers might decide to reserve the right to review a booking
request of a passenger - to study her profile for example. An interesting point of comparison
is whether drivers that review requests are less likely to take a minority passenger on board
during the pandemic. To test for this we carried out two regressions; results are displayed
in Table 6.
Column one presents the results of an OLS estimator, while column two is a within panel
estimator, where we control for driver fixed effects. The dependent variable takes the value
one when a passenger is a minority and zero otherwise; Covid-19 takes the value one for
reviews left after the 17th of March and zero otherwise. We are mostly interested in the
interaction : driver nonminority * Covid19 * manual.
We find that, first, during the Covid-19 there is an indeed higher chance of a passenger
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driver nonminority −0.083∗∗∗ (0.001)
number ratings 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.00000)
Covid-19 0.071∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.059∗∗∗ (0.004)
manual −0.022∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.001 (0.006)
Covid-19*driver nonminority −0.019∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.005)
Covid-19*manual 0.014∗∗ (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
driver nonminority*manual 0.015∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 (0.006)





Adjusted R2 0.009 −0.013
Residual Std. Error 0.286 (df = 1955460)
F Statistic 2,142.231∗∗∗ (df = 8; 1955460) 238.664∗∗∗ (df = 6; 1929823)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
being a minority. Second, non-minority drivers are less likely to have a minority passenger on
board, and it is even less so during the pandemic. Finally, the coefficient of the interaction:
driver nonminority * Covid19 * manual has a negative sign. Thus, non-minority drivers
that use manual acceptance are even less likely to accept a minority passenger during the
pandemic.16
6 Conclusion
Our results suggest that a decision maker encouraging the use of ride-sharing during or right
after the Covid-19 outbreak should take into account the likely increase in prices, particu-
larly in the regions which are already severely affected by the pandemic, and exacerbated
ethnic/racial inequality of access.
In our view, the price premium might be in part due to an increase in the perception
of health hazards associated with traveling with a stranger in the car. We provide evidence
suggesting that even daily reports of the number of cases shape drivers’ perception of such
16We have also carried out an analogous analysis concerning male versus female passengers. We do not
find any substantial differences due to the pandemic.
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risks. This result highlights the importance of the provision of accurate and up-to-date
information.
Design and comparison of policies that might ensure fair access to the service are out of
the scope of this article. There is, however, a rich literature studying discrimination in online
markets. For example in the context of ride-sharing, Ge et al. (2016) provides a comparison of
different platforms, which suggests that removing names from trip booking has the potential
to alleviate the immediate problem. Lambin and Palikot (2019) develops a structural model
which also shows that the removal of names can mitigate ethnic discrimination.
Finally, we would like to reiterate that the results obtained in this article are based
on observational data and we cannot have full confidence in their causal interpretation.
Although we have provided some robustness checks and controlled for a number of other
potential effects, further work is needed to fully understand the impact of an increase in risk
perception, due to a pandemic, on prices, and on access to the service of (ethnic) minorities.
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Figure 8: Covid-19 outbreak in time
Note: Sum of people hospitalized. Source https://www.data.gouv.fr/
A Timing of Covid-19 pandemic
In Figure 3 we have presented the geographical variation in the Covid-19 outbreak. However,
these data have also an interesting time dimension, which shows the timing of the pandemic.
In Figures 8 and 9, we show daily sums of the number of hospitalizations and positive test.
The two measures are closely related. It is also worth noticing that the shelter-at-home
orders were introduced just before the height of the pandemic and lasted throughout the
peak of it.
B Price regressions with larger sample
In the analysis of section 4.2, we have included driver characteristics collected using a web-
scrapper. This has allowed us to account for the impact on prices of these characteristics,
but at the same time substantially reduced the sample size.
In Table 7, we show the results of regressions with prices as the dependent variable and
Covid-19 outbreak measures as explanatory variables. The sample size is increased from 37
thousands to 239 thousands. The conclusion and even the magnitude of the effect are similar
to the baseline specification: prices are higher in the departments with more Covid-19 cases.
A1
Figure 9: Covid-19 outbreak in time
Note: The number of people tested positive per day. Source https://www.data.gouv.fr/
Table 7: Impact of Covid-19 outbreak on prices
Dependent variable:
log(price per km)
(1) (2) (3) (4)




red zone 0.088∗∗∗ (0.031)
total pop 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.00004)
booking manual 0.184∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.184∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.184∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.192∗∗∗ (0.007)
Constant −1.540∗∗∗ (0.153) −1.604∗∗∗ (0.117) −1.526∗∗∗ (0.122) −1.707∗∗∗ (0.134)
Day FE x x x x
Observations 239,923 239,923 239,923 239,923
R2 0.465 0.467 0.464 0.470
Adjusted R2 0.465 0.467 0.464 0.470
Residual Std. Error 0.763 (df = 239807) 0.761 (df = 239807) 0.763 (df = 239807) 0.759 (df = 239806)
F Statistic 1,811.323∗∗∗ (df = 115; 239807) 1,826.963∗∗∗ (df = 115; 239807) 1,806.699∗∗∗ (df = 115; 239807) 1,831.579∗∗∗ (df = 116; 239806)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
A2
Figure 10: Average number of offered seats
Note: Average number of offered seats over the data period; on the 26th of May the constraint
to maximum one seat has been lifted.
C Impact of Covid-19 on the number of sold seats
During the height of the Covid-19 pandemic BlaBlaCar has restricted the number of seats a
driver can offer on the platform to one. During the de-confinement, starting from the 26th
of May, this restriction has been lifted. Figure 10 documents it, by showing the average per
day of the number of seats offered by drivers.
Using the part of the dataset after the 26th of May we can study the determinants of
the number of sold seats per driver. The variables of key interests include price, measures
of the Covid-19 outbreak, and driver characteristics. We are interested in the elasticity of
passengers’ to changes in price and the impact of the virus. Note, that the availability of
other means of transportation might differ depending on the severity of the outbreak in a
given department.
To address the endogeneity of prices and quantity we introduce instrumental variables.
We use sums of characteristics of other drivers (driver male, average rating, number of
ratings) and the number of drivers departing from the same city on the same day, and the
number of listings on the same route. Such measure of distance in characteristics space
influence the markups that drivers can achieve but should not influence the utility of a
passenger Berry et al. (1995)).
Note, that we neither control for the number of seats a driver has offered nor for difference
in access to other forms of transportation across days and departments. Results are available
A3
in Table 8.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
price −0.031∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.020∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.018∗∗∗ (0.007)




driver male 2.177∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.133∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.112∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.111∗∗∗ (0.021)
manual booking 2.654∗∗∗ (0.140) −0.067∗∗∗ (0.026) −0.094∗∗∗ (0.025) −0.099∗∗∗ (0.023)
average rating −0.147∗ (0.079) 0.104∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.105∗∗∗ (0.008)
number of ratings −0.011∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001)
smoking 0.994∗∗∗ (0.153) 0.079∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.065∗∗∗ (0.017)
pets −0.598∗∗∗ (0.144) 0.010 (0.016) 0.015 (0.016) 0.016 (0.015)
instrument 1 0.307∗∗∗ (0.035)
instrument 2 −0.041∗∗ (0.019)
instrument 3 −0.001∗∗ (0.0003)
instrument 4 −0.299∗∗ (0.116)
instrument 5 0.011∗∗∗ (0.001)
Constant 10.892∗∗∗ (0.579) 0.396∗∗∗ (0.101) 0.289∗∗∗ (0.093) 0.295∗∗∗ (0.091)
Car Category x x x x
Day FE x x x x
Observations 25,587 25,587 25,587 25,587
R2 0.082 −0.197 −0.093 −0.076
Adjusted R2 0.079 −0.201 −0.097 −0.080
Residual Std. Error 10.645 (df = 25500) 1.152 (df = 25503) 1.100 (df = 25503) 1.092 (df = 25503)
F Statistic 26.566∗∗∗ (df = 86; 25500)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The first column in Table 8, shows the first stage regression results. We conclude that
the instruments we proposed are statistically significant. Regressions (2) to (4) show that
passengers’ have negative elasticity to changes in prices. Coefficients associated with the
number of the Covid-19 cases and hospitalizations are positive and significant, while the
number of deaths is statistically insignificant. Therefore, controlling for the differences in
prices, drivers in departments impacted stronger by the Covid-19 are selling more seats.
A4
